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TR
ABŪ NAṢR AL-FĀRĀBĪ ON THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SOUL
Abstract
Questions concerning the nature of self-consciousness, personal identity, and what becomes of these when the soul departs from the body have always been fundamental issues for philosophers. This article investigates whether, according to Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, the soul attains self-consciousness directly or indirectly, a distinction among types of self-consciousness is possible, and the soul maintains its self-consciousness and individual identity after death. The scope of this article extends to the relevant passages from the philosopher’s surviving works and fundamental texts in the secondary literature. The aim of the article is to reveal the philosopher’s contributions to this discussion. Since no study focusing on al-Fārābī has yet been encountered among texts written on self-consciousness, it can be said that the study possesses original value and significance in this respect. The article’s thesis advances that according to al-Fārābī, a reading of human souls as possessing self-consciousness that is direct, immediate, and continuous -beginning simultaneously with the soul’s existence together with the body and continuing with the soul’s continued existence- is possible. According to the conclusions reached, al-Fārābī considers that self-consciousness begins with the soul’s existence together with the body, and that this consciousness and individual identity continue with the soul’s persistence of existence after death. In contrast, he argues that the knowledge of self-consciousness occurs intermittently. The soul must separate itself from materiality, place itself at the centre of its apprehension, and intellectually perfect its secondary consciousness concerning the self to ultimate perfection. For souls that attain ultimate perfection, their self-consciousness and personal identity continue after their separation from the body; these souls are either rewarded with infinite happiness or punished with infinite torment. On the other hand, some souls perish together with the body due to their failure to attain this perfection. These souls lose their self-consciousness and identity.
Keywords
Kaynakça
- Adamson, Peter - Benevich, Fedor. “The Thought Experimental Method: Avicenna’s Flying Man Argument”. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4/2 (2018), 147-164.
- Al-Fārābī. al-Daʿāwā al-Qalbīyah. Bombay, 1935.
- Al-Fārābī. al-Madīnat al-fāḍilah. ed. Fawzi Miṭrī Najjār. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1971.
- Al-Fārābī. al-Siyāsat al-madaniyyah. ed. Fawzi Miṭrī Najjār. Beirut: Matba‘at Katholikiyye, 1964.
- Al-Fārābī. al-Taʿlīqāt. ed. Ja‘far al-Yāsīn. Beirut: Dār al-Manāhil, 1988.
- Al-Fārābī. Book of Letters (Kitāb al-ḥurūf). çev. Charles E. Butterworth. Berkeley: Zaytuna College, 2024.
- Al-Fārābī. Fuṣūl muntaza‘ah. ed. Fawzi Miṭrī Najjār. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1971.
- Al-Fārābī. “Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam”. al-Thamarat al-Marḍiyyah fi ba ‘d Risālāt al-Fārābīyyah. 66-83. Leiden, 1890.
Ayrıntılar
Birincil Dil
İngilizce
Konular
Dini Araştırmalar (Diğer)
Bölüm
Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar
Erken Görünüm Tarihi
2 Temmuz 2025
Yayımlanma Tarihi
28 Temmuz 2025
Gönderilme Tarihi
25 Şubat 2025
Kabul Tarihi
18 Haziran 2025
Yayımlandığı Sayı
Yıl 1970 Cilt: 12 Sayı: 23